Minimum Wages and Employment in France and the United States by John M. Abowd et al.
1. Introduction
In this paper we examine the link between changes in the minimum wage and employment
outcomes for men and women in France and the United States.  We make use of longitudinal data
on employment status and earnings to see how individuals are affected by real increases (in the
case of France) or real decreases (in the case of the United States) in the minimum wage
conditional on the individual’s location in the earnings distribution.  We take particular care to
distinguish sub-populations that might be affected differently by the minimum wage, focusing, in
particular, on low-wage workers and (in the case of France, where the data are available) on the
use of employment-promotion contracts that allow the payment of sub-minimum wages.
Although little attention has been paid to the situation in Europe
1, some European
countries provide interesting alternatives to the much-studied U.S. case.  France, in particular,
seems an ideal contrast to the United States.  Whereas in the United States the nominal federal
minimum wage remained constant for most states during most of the 1980s (thus implying a
declining real federal minimum wage), nominal minimum wages in France rose steadily over the
1980s, as did real minimum wages.  In this paper we exploit the different growth patterns in real
minimum wages in a symmetric manner to better understand their effect on employment.
Most existing studies of the French minimum wage system use aggregate time-series data
and find no effect of the minimum wage system on employment
2.  This could be considered
surprising because, since its inception, a significant percentage of the French labor force has been
employed at wages close to the minimum wage.  One reason for the orientation in the empirical
analyses done in France was, certainly, the tendency of American applied researchers to rely upon
aggregate time series analyses
3 prior to the widespread dissemination of public use micro-
economic data such as the Current Population Survey (CPS).  Another reason is that research
access to French micro-data was extremely limited until the 1990s.  In the present study we use
micro-data from France and the United States that were collected in household surveys which are
quite comparable.  In particular, we use longitudinal information on the workers.  Consequently,
we are able to analyze both French and American minimum wage systems using individual-level
panel data.
Because the real minimum wage in France and the U.S. moved in opposite directions
during our analysis period,
4 we have designed statistical comparisons that address the same
behavior using the different variations in the national minimum wage systems to identify the
                                               
1 See Dolado et. al. (1996) for a summary of minimum wage studies for France, the Netherlands, Spain and the
United Kingdom.
2 See, for example, Bazen and Martin (1991).
3 See Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982) for a review.
4 We do not consider state-specific minimum wages or youth subminimum wages in the United States, which
became increasingly important at the end of the 1980s.  See Neumark and Wascher (1992) for an explicit treatment
of this variation in the U.S. data.  Similarly, we do not explicitly control for minimum wages specified by collective
agreement in France that exceed the national minimum.  See Margolis (1993) for a detailed treatment of the effects
of the collective bargaining agreement salary grids on employment.2
relevant effects.  We use a statistical approach based on the analysis of employment transition
probabilities conditional on the position of an individual in the wage distribution.  We decompose
the wage distribution into 4 regions: under, around, marginally over and over the minimum wage.
Then, we exploit the size of the movements in the real minimum wage directly.
5  For France, we
use the automatic and legislated increases in the nominal minimum wage that occur (at least) each
July to identify groups of workers whose current wage rate will fall below the new minimum
wage rate after the increase.  We also identify workers whose present employment is part of a
special youth program that permits wage payments below the statutory minimum.  We use the
limited duration of employment spells in such programs to identify a second set of minimum wage
employment effects.  Our statistical analysis identifies the change in future employment
probabilities given an individual’s minimum wage status in the present period.
We show that individuals whose reference-year real wage was between the reference-year
real minimum wage and the comparison-year real minimum wage have substantially lower
subsequent employment probabilities than those whose real wages were not similarly situated.
This effect is particularly strong among younger workers. The conditional elasticity of subsequent
employment as a function of the real minimum wage for young male French workers in this
situation, evaluated at sample means, is -3.2 for 26-30 year olds and -4.3 for 31-35 year olds.
This effect is present even when unobserved labor market heterogeneity and labor supply behavior
are partially controlled by the inclusion of a separate category for workers marginally over the
minimum wage.  However, the impact of the minimum wage decreases with age.
For the United States we use the constancy of the nominal minimum wage between 1981
and 1987 to identify groups of employed workers whose real wage in a given period would have
been below the real minimum wage in the previous period.  We show that young men whose real
wages were between the two real minimum wages, as described above, had lower employment
probabilities in the previous period than individuals whose real wages were not.  The conditional
elasticity, evaluated at sample means, is -1.6 for 26-30 year olds and -2.3 for 31-35 year olds.  For
women, these effects, favoring employment of persons that were previously not employed, are
present at all ages.
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides some institutional background on
the systems of minimum wages in both France and the United States, and provides some
preliminary indications of the potential impact in each case based on empirical wage distributions.
Section 3 describes the data that we used to analyze the impact of minimum wages, and section 4
lays out the statistical models used to evaluate the employment effects of minimum wage changes.
Section 5 details our conditional logit analyses.  Section 6 concludes.
2.  Institutional Background
2.1  France
The first minimum wage law in France was enacted in 1950, creating a guaranteed hourly
wage rate that was partially indexed to the rate of increase in consumer prices. Beginning in 1970,
the original minimum wage law was replaced by the current system, called the SMIC “Salaire
Minimum Interprofessionnel de Croissance,” linking the changes in the minimum wage to both
                                               
5 Our analysis bears some resemblance to that of Linneman (1982).3
consumer price inflation and growth in the hourly blue-collar wage rate.  In addition to formula-
based increases in the SMIC, the government also legislated increases many times over the next
two decades.  The statutory minimum wage in France regulates the hourly regular cash
compensation received by an employee, including the employee’s part of any payroll taxes
6.
Figure 1 shows the time series for the nominal French minimum wage and the associated
employee-paid and employer-paid payroll taxes.  Because of the extensive use of payroll taxes to
finance mandatory employee benefits, by the 1980s the French minimum wage imposed a
substantially greater cost upon the employer than its statutory value.  Employees share in the legal
allocation of the payroll taxes, as the figure shows; however, low wage workers benefit
substantially more than the average worker from social security benefits financed through these
taxes.  In general, the payroll taxes are proportional to employee’s gross salary; however, the
social programs—particularly, unemployment insurance, health care, retirement income and
employment programs—benefit low wage workers substantially more (Abowd and Bognanno,
1995).  Appendix Table A provides a complete statistical history of the real and nominal SMIC,
including employer and employee payroll tax components.
                                               
6 In theory, there are no provisions in any of the minimum wage laws that would allow regional variation in the
SMIC.  In some sectors in the French economy, however, the effective minimum wage was determined by
collective bargaining agreements.  Because they were often extended by the Minister of Labor to include employers
who were not party to the original negotiations, these agreements typically covered entire regions and industries.
Although relatively important in the 1970s, these provisions became increasingly irrelevant during the 1980s (our
period of analysis) since the collectively bargained nominal salary grids remained fixed in the face of an increasing
nominal SMIC.4




























































































Wage including all payroll taxes Statutory Minimum Wage
Wage net of all payroll taxes
Figure 2 shows the hourly real French minimum wage from 1950 to 1994.  Even though
the original French minimum wage program, called the SMIG “Salaire Minimum
Interprofessionnel Garanti,” was only partially indexed, the real minimum wage did not decline
measurably over the entire post-war period and increased substantially during most decades.5




















































































































The French minimum wage lies near most of the mass of the wage rate distribution for the
employed work force.  To show the location of the SMIC in this distribution, we plotted the
empirical distribution of hourly wage rates for 1990, the earliest year for which the Labor Force
Survey reports continuous wage data.  Figure 3 shows these data.  We have indicated the SMIC
directly on the figure. Notice that the first mode of the wage distribution is within five francs of
the minimum wage and the second mode is within 10 francs of the minimum.  In the overall
distribution, 13.6% of the wage earners lie at or below the minimum wage and an additional
14.4% lie within an additional 5F per hour of the SMIC.6












































































Dolado et. al. (1996) discuss the incidence of the SMIC with respect to household income.
They find that, although people employed at the SMIC do tend to be in the poorest households,
the distribution of “smicards” (people paid the SMIC) is not monotonically decreasing in
household income.  For example, they find that the share of individuals paid the SMIC in each
decile of household income increases from 10.1% in the lowest decile to 13.1% in the 3
rd lowest
decile, then decreases to 6.6% for the 5
th decile, increasing to 7.4% for the 6
th decile and then
declining monotonically to 0.6% in the highest decile of household income.
2.2 United States
The first national minimum wage in the United States was a part of the original Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938.  The American national minimum wage has never been indexed
and increases only when legislative changes are enacted.  The national minimum applies only to
workers covered by the FLSA, whose coverage has been extended over the years to include most
jobs.  The statutory minimum wage regulates the hourly regular cash compensation received by an
employee including the employee’s part of any payroll taxes.
Figures 4 and 5 show the distribution of the American hourly wage rate and the location
of the minimum wage in that distribution for 1981 and 1987, the beginning and ending year of our
analyses
7.  For 1981, 17.7% of the employed work force had wage rates at or below the minimum
wage and an additional 14.6% had wage rates within an additional $1.00 per hour of the
minimum.  For 1987, only 9.5% of employed persons have hourly wage rates at or below the
minimum while an additional 9.9% lie within the next $1.00 per hour.
                                               
7 It should be noted that the federal minimum wage was increased to $3.35/hour in 1980.7
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3.  Data Description
3.a.  France
The French data were extracted from the “Enquête Emploi” (Labor Force Survey) for the
years 1981 to 1989. The sixty thousand households included in the Labor Force Survey sample
were interviewed in March of three consecutive years with one-third of the households replaced
each year.  The longitudinal design of the French Labor Force Survey is based on the domicile
address and not on the household composition.  Individuals who were interviewed in the first
wave were reinterviewed in subsequent waves unless they had moved out of the originally8
sampled domicile.  Our longitudinal analysis used any individual for whom pairwise consecutive
yearly observations were available.  We used the INSEE research files for each of the indicated
years.  These files include the identifiers that allow us to follow individuals from year to year.
Using these identifiers, we created year-to-year matched files for the years 1981-82 to 1988-89.
The survey measures usual monthly earnings, net of employee payroll taxes but including
employee income taxes, and usual weekly hours.  Usual monthly earnings is measured in 20
intervals of widths varying from 500F to 5,000F.  It is important to note that the narrowest
intervals were used for the lowest salaries.  Since minimum wages are defined on an hourly basis,






52 , where salt  is the midpoint of the
declared monthly earnings category and hourst  represents usual weekly hours, both
corresponding to year t.
Certain young workers were employed in publicly-funded programs that either combined
classroom education with work (“apprentis”, “stage de qualification” or “stage d’insertion,
contrat emploi-formation”) or provide subsidized low-wage employment (“TUC, travaux d’utilité
collective” or “SIVP, stage d’initiation à la vie professionnelle” both from 1985 to 1989).  All of
these programs provide a legal exemption from the SMIC and from certain payroll taxes.  Most of
these programs are limited to workers 25 years old and under.
The employment status in year t is equal to one for all individuals who are employed in
March of the survey year, and equal to 0 otherwise.  The French Labor Force Survey definition of
employment is the same as the one used by the International Labor Office: a person is employed if
he or she worked for pay for at least one hour during the reference week.  The definition is thus
consistent with the American BLS definition used below.
Our control variables consisted of education, potential labor force experience, seniority,
region of France, date of labor force entry and year.  Education was constructed as eight
categories: none, completed elementary school, completed junior high school, completed basic
vocational/technical school, completed advanced vocational/technical school, completed high
school (baccalauréat), completed technical college or undergraduate university, and completed
graduate school or post-college professional school.  Potential labor force experience was
computed as the difference between current age and age at school exit.  Seniority was measured
as the response to a direct question on the survey (years with the present employer).  Region is an
indicator variable for the “Ile de France” (Paris metropolitan area) as the region of residence. In
all of our analyses we also control for the real hourly wage rate in the analysis period.
The SMIC data were taken from Bayet (1994), which reports official INSEE statistics.
We selected the hourly SMIC for March of the indicated year, net of employee payroll taxes.
3.b.  United States
We used the NBER extracts of the outgoing rotation group files from the Current
Population Survey for the years 1981 to 1987.  We applied the U.S. Census Bureau matching
algorithm to create year-to-year linked files for the years 1981-82 to 1986-87.
The outgoing rotation groups (households being interviewed for the fourth or eighth time
in the CPS rotation schedule) are asked to report the usual weekly wage and usual weekly hours.
Individuals who normally are paid by the hour were asked to report that wage rate directly.  We
created an hourly wage rate using the directly reported hourly wage rate, when available, and the
ratio of usual weekly earnings to usual weekly hours, otherwise.  Respondents are asked to report
these wage measures gross of employee payroll taxes, so they are not directly comparable to the9
measures constructed from the French data, which are reported net of employee payroll taxes.
We created real hourly wage rates by dividing by the 1982-84-based Consumer Price Index for all
Urban Workers for the appropriate month.
We created a second set of hourly wage measures for the United States that included
income from tips in the hourly wage.  To do this we computed the second hourly wage rate as
usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours for workers who reported that they were
paid by the hour.  When this second hourly wage rate exceeded the one directly reported, we used
the computed measure.  This measure of hourly wage rate is referred to as “including income
from tips.”
An individual is employed in year t if he or she worked at least one hour for pay during the
second week of the survey month.  We used the CPS employment status recode variable to
determine employment.  The BLS definition is thus consistent with the one used in the French
Labor Force Survey.
Our control variables consist of education, potential labor force experience, race, marital
status and region.  Education was constructed as the number of years required to reach the
highest grade completed. Potential labor force experience is age minus years of education minus
five.  Race is one for nonwhite individuals.  Marital status is one for married persons.  Region is a
set of three indicator variables for the northeast, north-central and southern parts of the U.S.  In
all of our analyses we also control for the real hourly wage rate in the analysis period.
The U.S. national nominal minimum wage was $3.35 throughout our analysis period.
3.c.  Conditional Transition Probabilities
A preliminary analysis of the empirical transition probabilities of workers into or out of
employment based on their positions in the wage distribution relative to the minimum wage
suggests that one might expect to see significant impacts of the minimum wage on employment
probabilities in both France and the United States.  In the case of France, we study the probability
that an individual is employed at the date t+1 given the person’s wage rate relative to the SMIC
at date t.  In the case of the United States, the question is whether or not an individual was
employed at date t given the wage rate relative to the minimum at date t+1.
Let miwt  be the nominal hourly minimum wage in year t, rmiwt  be the real hourly
minimum wage in year t and ht  represent the number of monthly hours worked in the sample
month in year t.  Let wt  be the individual’s nominal hourly wage rate in year t and rwt be the real
hourly wage for year t. All hourly individual and minimum wage rates are defined net of the
employee’s share of payroll taxes for both countries regardless of the original measurement units.
Then, we define the following 4 departure (occupied at date t) states:
• Employed at t and paid under the SMIC  ( ) ( ) 1 I = < t t rmiw rw
• Employed at t and paid between the SMIC at date t and the SMIC at date t+1
( ) ( ) 1 I 1 = < £ + t t t rmiw rw rmiw
• Employed at t and paid a wage at date t that is marginally above the SMIC at date t+1
( ) ( ) 1 15 . 1 I 1 1 = · < £ + + t t t rmiw rw rmiw
• Employed at t and paid a wage at date t that is well above the SMIC at date t+1
( ) ( ) 1 15 . 1 I 1 = £ · + t t rw rmiw
where I(.) is the indicator function taking the value 1 when the condition is true and 0 otherwise.
We also define two arrival (occupied at date t+1) states:10
• Employed at t+1
• Not Employed at t+1.
For the United States, recall that the nominal minimum wage was constant over the entire
sample period at $3.35 per hour.  Let rmargt  be the real value of $4.00 per hour at date t. Thus
we construct the 4 departure states as:
8
• Employed at t+1 and paid less than the real minimum wage at date t+1  ( ) ( ) 1 I 1 1 = < + + t t rmiw rw
• Employed at t+1 and paid between the real minimum wage at date t+1 and the real minimum
wage at date t  ( ) ( ) 1 I 1 1 = < £ + + t t t rmiw rw rmiw
• Employed at t+1 and paid marginally above the real minimum wage at date t
( ) ( ) 1 I 1 = < £ + t t t rmarg rw rmiw
• Employed at t and paid well above the minimum wage  ( ) ( ) 1 I 1 = £ + t t rw rmarg .
We define the two arrival states as:
• Employed at t
• Not Employed at t.
Table 1 describes the unconditional probability of employment during the comparison year
over the sample period for the French and the American workers who are paid at the minimum or
marginally above the minimum in the reference year.  Thus the table shows the probability of
being employed at date t+1 for groups defined by their wage relative to the minimum at date t in
France.  Similarly, Table 1 considers the employment probability at date t for groups defined by
their wage relative to the minimum at date t+1 for the United States. The statistics are
decomposed by age and sex in both countries.
                                               
8 We remind the reader that the U.S. analysis is conducted predicting the employment state in period t given the
state in t+1; thus, the t+1 state is the departure state.11
Table 1
Cell Sizes and Transition Probabilities
France United States
Age Men Women Men Women
Category Cell Size P(empt+1=1) Cell Size P(empt+1=1) Cell Size P(empt=1) Cell Size P(empt=1)
Between the Two Minima
16-20 161 0.6894 153 0.8693 2942 0.7226 3441 0.6010
21-25 231 0.8442 295 0.8475 842 0.7518 1325 0.6091
26-30 102 0.8824 197 0.8629 262 0.7176 777 0.5997
31-35 74 0.8514 158 0.9051 167 0.7485 669 0.6383
36-40 53 0.9434 131 0.9313 94 0.8191 531 0.6026
41-45 54 0.8704 88 0.8409 97 0.7113 466 0.6545
46-50 57 0.9474 108 0.8889 96 0.7500 429 0.6993
56-55 68 0.8382 103 0.8544 86 0.7442 421 0.6817
56-60 48 0.6250 52 0.7885 111 0.7658 382 0.7592
Marginally Over the Minimum
16-20 577 0.7123 460 0.8804 3184 0.7670 3169 0.6412
21-25 1424 0.8968 1354 0.9010 1618 0.7676 2099 0.6665
26-30 916 0.9345 980 0.8990 622 0.7749 1445 0.6858
31-35 694 0.9179 922 0.9284 376 0.7979 1348 0.6773
36-40 543 0.9079 778 0.9254 211 0.7678 1235 0.6988
41-45 405 0.9235 634 0.9306 222 0.7793 993 0.7251
46-50 480 0.9146 727 0.9243 149 0.7450 943 0.7370
56-55 450 0.8756 612 0.9020 191 0.7592 809 0.7602
56-60 299 0.7358 340 0.8147 223 0.8027 771 0.7536
By comparing workers paid at the minimum with those paid marginally above the
minimum, we obtain our first indication that the minimum wage has an impact on employment.
For practically all age categories and both sexes, workers employed at the minimum in the
reference year are less likely to be employed in the comparison year than workers employed
marginally above the minimum in the reference year.  The comparison is relevant in that workers
employed between the two minima are directly affected by movements in the minimum wage,
whereas the effects on those employed marginally above the minimum are indirect at best, ceteris
paribus.
It is also important to note that the symmetric, yet opposite, movements of the real
minimum wage rates in the two countries have similar implications for a competitive view of labor
markets.  In France, either the value of marginal product (VMP) for “between” workers increases,
or they will be unemployable in the following period.  In the United States, “between” workers
have a VMP that was too low to make their employment profitable at date t, but the decreasing
real minimum wage opened up opportunities to legally employ them and pay them their VMP.  In
neither country will movements in the minimum wage directly affect workers paid marginally
above the minimum wage rate.
Clearly, this descriptive analysis is not sufficient to discredit the hypothesis that low wage
workers are, in some way, qualitatively different from high wage workers.  To separate out this
effect, we need to control for worker characteristics
9 in order to analyze more thoroughly the
transitions between employment and nonemployment.
                                               
9 There remains a possibility that unobserved worker heterogeneity might bias our results in section 5.
Unfortunately, there is no easy way to control for unobserved heterogeneity in this context.  Indeed, we suppose
that the inclusion of the “marginally above” the minimum wage group is sufficient to capture any heterogeneity in12
4.  Minimum Wage Effects on Employment: Conditional Logit Analysis
In order to control for the impact that variables, including the minimum wage and its
movements, might have on labor market transitions, we applied the following statistical technique.
As in the previous section, we exploit the size of changes in the real minimum wage rate to
categorize workers as “between” old and new values of the real minimum wage (i.e. with an
hourly real wage rate lying between the old and the new real minimum wage).  We use a
conditional logit analysis of subsequent (or prior) employment probabilities to see if workers who
might be directly affected by real minimum wage changes have significantly different subsequent
(or prior) employment probabilities.
Once again, let rmiwt  be the real hourly minimum wage rate in year t and let rwt be the
real hourly wage rate for year t, both net of employee payroll taxes.  Let aget represent an
individual’s age at the date t and staget  indicate that the person was employed under some
employment promotion contract that allows for sub-minimum wages in year t.  Finally, let et
indicate the individual’s employment status (employed=1) in year t.
We define a person as “between” in France if the mean of the cell in which the person is
located at the date t is at or above the minimum wage at date t but below the minimum wage (in
date t francs) at date t+1.  Algebraically, after defining rwt to be the mean of the cell in which the
individual is located and use the condition
( ) I rmiw rw rmiw t t t £ £ = +1 1.
We also break up the sub-minimum population (those for whom rwt<rmiwt) into two groups in
France: those on employment-promotion contracts (staget ) and those not on employment-
promotion contracts.  Thus, for France, we estimate variants of the following equation for
individuals:
[ ]
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( ) ( ) ( )
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where F(·) is the standard logistic distribution function.  The logit described in equation (1) allows
us to test the hypothesis, implied by the theory of competitive labor markets, that if marginal
productivity stays constant, increases in the real minimum wage render previously employed
individuals, whose wages fall in between the old and new minima, currently unemployable.  In
                                                                                                                                                      
transition rates that is correlated with wages. In addition, we always control for the actual real wage rate in the
appropriate period.13
particular, this specification also allows us to see if the effects of the minimum wage vary with
age.  
10
We define a person as “between” in the United States if the person’s real hourly wage at
the date t+1 is at or above the minimum wage at date t+1 but below the minimum wage (in date
t+1 dollars) at date t.  Algebraically, this is equivalent to
( ) I rmiw rw rmiw t t t + + £ £ = 1 1 1.
We also define the variable rmargt as the deflated value of $4.00 at date t.  Thus for the United
States, we estimate variants of the following equation:
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The interpretation of equation (2) is symmetric to that of equation (1).  Does a relatively large
decrease in the real minimum wage allow previously unemployable individuals to be employed?
Furthermore, in the United States, we explicitly examine the impact that tips might have on our
measure of the position of a person in the wage distribution.  However, since our wage measure
that excludes tips uses reported rather than constructed data
11, the focus of our analysis in section
5 is on the no-tips wage measure
12.
Notice that the equations for the U.S. have empirical content because the nominal
minimum wage rate does not change during our sample period whereas the real minimum wage
rate declines because of general price inflation.  In contrast, the equations for France have
empirical content because the indexation formula is tied to general price inflation and to the
growth in average hourly earnings among blue-collar workers, and as noted in section 2.1, real
minimum wages increased steadily throughout the sample period
13.
                                               
10 We experimented with different forms of age aggregation in order to evaluate particular labor market
phenomena such as the end of eligibility for employment promotion contracts or mandatory military service.  Our
results are not sensitive to the age categories shown in the tables.
11 Welch (1997) provides evidence on various sorts of measurement error in the Current Population Survey, and
hints that hours are likely to be a greater source of measurement error than wages.
12 We report our results based on the wage measure that includes tips in appendix B.
13 Our conditional logit estimates are performed on the set of individuals who are employed at some point in the
sample.  Thus the coefficients should not necessarily be interpreted as representative of the entire potential labor
force, but rather as appropriate for the sample of  workers who satisfy the selection criterion.14
5.  Conditional Logit Results
5.a.  France
Table 2 shows the results of estimating equation (1) for France separately for men and
women, using broad age categories. We report only the coefficients on the key real minimum
wage variables, although many other control variables were included in the regressions
14.
The coefficients show that French men aged 21-25, 26-30, and 31-35 with real wage rates
in period t that are between the real minima in t and t+1 have much lower subsequent employment
probabilities than men paid real wages in period t that are marginally above the period t+1 real
minimum wage.  The elasticities are quite large: an increase of 1% in the real minimum wage
entails a decrease in the probability of remaining employed of approximately 1.4% (resp. 3.2%
and 4.3%), relative to men aged 21-25 (resp. 26-30 and 31-35) who are paid marginally above the
minimum.
15  Older men (36 and above) paid around the minimum do not seem to be more affected
by minimum wage increases than similar men paid marginally above. Aggregated over all age
groups, an increase of 1% in the real minimum wage entails a decrease in the probability of
remaining employed of 1.29%, for male workers in the appropriate at risk group (real wage rates
in t that are between the t and t+1 real minima).  One interpretation of these results is that
although low-wage workers do differ from high wage workers (as the fairly consistent negative
coefficients suggest), the minimum wage hits young French men whose real wages are between
the two minima much harder than other low wage workers.
                                               
14 In addition to demographic variables (the complete list of which appears in the notes to the tables), we also
included measures of the type of employment contract.  In particular, we explicitly distinguish between fixed
duration contracts (contrats à durée déterminée, CDD), youth employment schemes (young stagiaire), and
apprenticeships, with the reference group being long term contracts (contrats à durée déterminée, CDI).  See
Abowd, Corbel, and Kramarz (1999) for details on the importance of distinguishing between CDDs and CDIs.
15 It should be noted that, due to the relatively small cell sizes (see table 1), the differences in coefficients among
the “between” and “marginally above” workers are only occasionally statistically significant.  Appendix table C
shows the differences in coefficients and their standard errors.  Nevertheless, the consistent sign and magnitude of
the differences suggests the presence of an economically important phenomenon.15
Table 2
Estimated Effect of Real French Minimum Wage Increases
On Subsequent Employment Probabilities - Detailed Age Categories
Name of effect Coefficient
Standard 
Error P-Value Elasticity
A. Men, hourly wage
16 £ Aget £ 20 8.9618 2.7304 0.0010 3.0535
21 £ Aget £ 25 19.3665 2.1802 0.0001 1.4376
26 £ Aget £ 30 16.3522 2.2665 0.0001 0.5974
31 £ Aget £ 35 14.4636 2.3528 0.0001 0.4353
36 £ Aget £ 40 16.3136 2.5620 0.0001 0.4457
41 £ Aget £ 45 18.2648 2.6125 0.0001 0.5224
46 £ Aget £ 50 22.0395 2.3699 0.0001 0.8017
51 £ Aget £ 55 9.3443 1.8993 0.0001 1.0101
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(16 £ Aget £ 20) -7.5492 7.7608 0.3307 -2.3445
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(21 £ Aget £ 25) -15.0196 8.3891 0.0734 -2.3407
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(26 £ Aget £ 30) -33.7128 11.4511 0.0032 -3.9662
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(31 £ Aget £ 35) -34.9743 15.5535 0.0245 -5.1989
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(36 £ Aget £ 40) -8.5172 25.6534 0.7399 -0.4821
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(41 £ Aget £ 45) -18.5268 16.5751 0.2637 -2.4016
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(46 £ Aget £ 50) 26.4611 27.0334 0.3277 1.3927
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(51 £ Aget £ 55) 10.9252 15.0434 0.4677 1.7673
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(16 £ Aget £ 20) -0.8342 3.7453 0.8237 -0.2400
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(21 £ Aget £ 25) -8.9479 3.3443 0.0075 -0.9237
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(26 £ Aget £ 30) -11.4209 5.0211 0.0229 -0.7481
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(31 £ Aget £ 35) -10.9114 6.0231 0.0701 -0.8962
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(36 £ Aget £ 40) -14.5228 6.6566 0.0291 -1.3373
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(41 £ Aget £ 45) -1.8726 7.4896 0.8026 -0.1433
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(46 £ Aget £ 50) -0.3603 6.2610 0.9541 -0.0308
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(51 £ Aget £ 55) 13.6077 4.9606 0.0061 1.6934
Source: French Labor Force Survey, 1981-89, matched year to year.
Notes: Equations estimated by maximum likelihood logit. All equations include indicators for year, education (8 groups), region
(Ile de France), age (8 groups), fixed term contract, young stagiaire, apprentice, paid under the SMIC and young stagiaire and paid
under the SMIC and not young stagiaire, as well as the continuous variables labor force experience (through quartic), seniority,
seniority squared and hourly wage in year t (through cubic).  All displayed coefficients are equal to the indicated group multiplied
by the real percentage increase in the SMIC between year t and t+1 (1981=100).  The coefficients and elasticities show the partial
effects on the probability of employment in year t+1, given employment in year t.  Only people aged 16-60 years old were considered.
Sample size is 103,893.16
Table 2 (continued)
Estimated Effect of Real French Minimum Wage Increases
On Subsequent Employment Probabilities - Detailed Age Categories
Name of effect Coefficient
Standard 
Error P-Value Elasticity
B. Women, hourly wage
16 £ Aget £ 20 16.9146 3.8462 0.0001 3.0692
21 £ Aget £ 25 15.9104 2.5178 0.0001 1.4622
26 £ Aget £ 30 13.6156 2.4542 0.0001 0.9190
31 £ Aget £ 35 15.0055 2.5587 0.0001 0.7641
36 £ Aget £ 40 16.2339 2.8474 0.0001 0.6999
41 £ Aget £ 45 8.2563 2.8771 0.0041 0.4352
46 £ Aget £ 50 16.2562 2.9226 0.0001 0.8718
51 £ Aget £ 55 11.6159 2.5352 0.0001 1.1256
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(16 £ Aget £ 20) -0.1906 9.4827 0.9840 -0.0249
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(21 £ Aget £ 25) -17.6620 6.7599 0.0090 -2.6942
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(26 £ Aget £ 30) -21.6794 8.1511 0.0078 -2.9713
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(31 £ Aget £ 35) -11.8064 11.8761 0.3202 -1.1209
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(36 £ Aget £ 40) -3.4636 14.0054 0.8047 -0.2380
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(41 £ Aget £ 45) -20.1718 10.2238 0.0485 -3.2091
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(46 £ Aget £ 50) -4.7538 11.9464 0.6907 -0.5282
(Real SMICt £ Real Waget £ Real SMICt+1)*(51 £ Aget £ 55) -4.5943 9.8911 0.6423 -0.6691
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(16 £ Aget £ 20) 1.0815 5.1320 0.8331 0.1293
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(21 £ Aget £ 25) -6.5726 3.2759 0.0448 -0.6505
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(26 £ Aget £ 30) -3.9517 4.0511 0.3293 -0.3992
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(31 £ Aget £ 35) -1.0531 4.7761 0.8255 -0.0754
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(36 £ Aget £ 40) -6.1224 5.3456 0.2521 -0.4564
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(41 £ Aget £ 45) 8.4310 5.8332 0.1484 0.5851
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(46 £ Aget £ 50) -2.2374 5.1996 0.6670 -0.1693
(Real SMICt+1 £ Real Waget £ (1.15*Real SMICt+1))*(51 £ Aget £ 55) 1.8236 4.6858 0.6971 0.1788
Source: French Labor Force Survey, 1981-89, matched year to year.
Notes: Equations estimated by maximum likelihood logit. All equations include indicators for year, education (8 groups), region
(Ile de France), age (8 groups), fixed term contract, young stagiaire, apprentice, paid under the SMIC and young stagiaire and paid
under the SMIC and not young stagiaire, as well as the continuous variables labor force experience (through quartic), seniority,
seniority squared and hourly wage in year t (through cubic).  All displayed coefficients are equal to the indicated group multiplied
by the real percentage increase in the SMIC between year t and t+1 (1981=100).  The coefficients and elasticities show the partial
effects on the probability of employment in year t+1, given employment in year t.  Only people aged 16-60 years old were considered.
Sample size is 80,490. 
Similar results hold for French women, the implied conditional elasticity aggregated over
all age groups implies that a 1% increase in the real minimum wage rate entails a decrease in the
reemployment probability for female French workers paid around the minimum of 0.97% (as
compared to workers paid marginally above the minimum).  There are important negative
employment effects for most age groups in the 16-35 year old categories,  Furthermore, it is
interesting to note that a large difference in elasticities also appears for women aged 41-45.  Not
coincidentally, this corresponds to the age at which many women reenter the labor force after17
having withdrawn to raise children.  Thus, this difference could be reflecting a delayed version of
the minimum wage effect already observed for younger women.
In other related work that focused specifically on the youth labor market
16, we found that
all of the types of employment contracts studied here tend to lead to more precarious labor force
attachment than an indefinite term contract, but the employment promotion contracts (young
stagiaires) seem to provide relative security for the subminimum population
17.  Looking at these
populations in more detail, we found that 25-year old French men whose wages were between the
two minima and who would no longer be eligible for employment promotion contracts the
following year because of their age were dramatically affected by the minimum wage increases.
The elasticity of -15.9 (expressed as a difference from the “marginally above” category), and the
subsequent negative coefficients for “between” men are consistent with the idea that the minimum
wage has a strong negative impact on subsequent employment probabilities for this very small
group.  In addition, the presence of employment promotion contracts, and the reduction in
employer payroll taxes that they imply, helps workers who are under 25 to find new jobs within
the year when faced with a steadily increasing real SMIC.  However, when workers are no longer
eligible for such contracts, their probability of being out of a job the following year increases
dramatically. This supports the hypothesis that “between” workers who are eligible for
employment promotion contracts are shielded from the negative effects of movements in the
SMIC, but “older” young workers are not.  More precisely, it suggests that the reason why there
seems to be some evidence of a difference among the “between” and “marginally above” workers
in the 21-25 age group is because of the inclusion of 25 year-olds in the group.
In addition to estimating our conditional logits with “marginally above” the SMIC defined
as 1.15 times the SMIC, we also estimated these models with two alternative definitions of
“marginally above” (1.10 and 1.20 times the SMIC).  Table 3 analyzes the robustness of the
coefficients for the “between” and “marginally above” categories to these changes in the definition
of “marginally above”. Overall, it seems that our results are robust to changes in the definition of
“marginal”.
                                               
16 See Abowd, Kramarz, Lemieux, and Margolis (1998).
17 See also Bonnal, Fougère, and Sérandon (1997) for an analysis of the impact of the youth employment schemes
on employment histories.18
Table 3
Robustness of Conditional Logit Results to Variations in the Definition of "Marginally Over the Minimum"
Narrow Medium Wide
Between Marginally Over Between Marginally Over Between Marginally Over
FRANCE
Men -10.1034 -4.2497 -10.7088 -5.0710 -11.4736 -5.0253
(0.8110) (0.4725) (0.8185) (0.2848) (0.8491) (0.3601)
Women -10.2024 -0.3734 -10.4226 -1.2055 -10.8823 -2.3282
(0.6274) (0.4137) (0.6334) (0.2404) (0.6722) (0.2870)
UNITED STATES
Without Tips
Men -3.7279 -1.0940 -5.1535 -3.7957 -5.2996 -3.5492
(1.1264) (1.2960) (1.2485) (1.0898) (1.3139) (1.0580)
Women -6.5302 -5.4114 -7.6003 -5.2458 -7.8009 -4.5091
(0.7789) (0.7935) (0.8723) (0.7193) (0.9480) (0.7179)
With Tips
Men -3.8026 -2.5482 -4.7312 -3.9658 -4.7241 -3.5054
(1.1310) (1.2582) (1.2187) (1.0462) (1.2679) (1.0063)
Women -7.7191 -6.0250 -8.6482 -5.7390 -9.0930 -5.1699
(0.7520) (0.7557) (0.8123) (0.6631) (0.8607) (0.6482)
Sources: French Labor Force Survey, 1981-89, matched year to year and American Current Population Survey, 1981-87, matched year to year.
Notes: Coefficients come from logistic regressions conditional on employment at the date t for France and the date t+1 for the United States.  For
France, the categories are defined as:  Narrow = SMIC to 1.10*SMIC, Medium = SMIC to 1.15*SMIC and Wide = SMIC to 1.20*SMIC.  For the
United States, the categories are defined as: Narrow = $3.35 to $3.75, Medium = $3.35 to $4.00 and Wide = $3.35 to $4.25.  See the notes to tables
3, 4 and 6, 7 and 8 for details on other variables in the regressions.
5.b.  United States
Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (2) using the hourly wage measure that
excludes income from tips
18.  For both men and women, individuals aged 26 to 35 who are
employed in year t+1 were more likely to have been unemployed or out of the labor force in t if
their real wage in t+1 was between the real minimum wage in years t and t+1.  The magnitudes of
these effects are large—male elasticities relative to the “marginally above” group of -1.6 and -2.3
for men aged 26-30 and 31-35 and female elasticities of -3.2 and -0.7 for women in the same age
groups.  On the other hand, the results for workers aged between 36 and 40 go in the opposite
direction: workers between the minima have a higher chance of coming from employment than
those paid marginally above, the elasticity being 3.7.  It should be noted, however, that this result
is based on relatively small numbers of observations (see table 1).  By weighting the age groups,
we find that a decrease in the real minimum wage of 1% between t and t+1 is related to an
increased probability of having been non-employed at t of 0.42% for those men who are paid
between the t+1 and t minimum wages (relative to those employed marginally above the minimum
at date t)
19.
                                               
18 Estimates based on the wage measure that includes income from tips can be found in appendix B.
19 For American men under 30, the equivalent number is 2.2% (Abowd et al., 1998).19
Table 4
Estimated Effect of Real U.S. Minimum Wage Increases On Prior
Employment Probabilities (Excluding Tips) - Detailed Age Categories
Name of effect Coefficient
Standard 
Error P-Value Elasticity
A. Men, hourly wage
21 £ Aget £ 25 -3.4725 1.4425 0.0160 -0.5664
26 £ Aget £ 30 -4.9361 1.6546 0.0030 -0.5465
31 £ Aget £ 35 -8.9720 1.7343 0.0000 -0.8611
36 £ Aget £ 40 -13.9186 1.7898 0.0000 -1.4973
41 £ Aget £ 45 -18.6543 1.7875 0.0000 -2.5769
46 £ Aget £ 50 -16.0392 1.8084 0.0000 -2.3256
51 £ Aget £ 55 -4.9134 1.8768 0.0090 -0.6287
56 £ Aget  6.8403 2.0049 0.0010 0.8162
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(21 £ Aget £ 25) -6.3444 2.1470 0.0030 -1.5748
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(26 £ Aget £ 30) -16.3462 3.5017 0.0000 -4.6169
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(31 £ Aget £ 35) -16.1664 4.4097 0.0000 -4.0658
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(36 £ Aget £ 40) 6.2142 6.9981 0.3750 1.1238
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(41 £ Aget £ 45) -6.9491 5.3736 0.1960 -2.0059
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(46 £ Aget £ 50) -3.1808 5.4970 0.5630 -0.7952
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(51 £ Aget £ 55) -4.2713 5.7809 0.4600 -1.0927
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(56 £ Aget ) -2.7722 5.5873 0.6200 -0.6493
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(21 £ Aget £ 25) -6.1935 1.7716 0.0000 -1.4393
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(26 £ Aget £ 30) -13.3077 2.6182 0.0000 -2.9953
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(31 £ Aget £ 35) -8.7785 3.4280 0.0100 -1.7744
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(36 £ Aget £ 40) -11.1244 4.2849 0.0090 -2.5834
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(41 £ Aget £ 45) -1.3115 4.2534 0.7580 -0.2895
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(46 £ Aget £ 50) -5.9015 4.7737 0.2160 -1.5051
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(51 £ Aget £ 55) -6.2780 4.4262 0.1560 -1.5120
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(56 £ Aget ) -3.4710 4.3157 0.4210 -0.6849
Source:  American Current Population Survey, 1981-87, matched year to year.
Notes: Equations estimated by maximum likelihood logit. All equations include indicators for year, region (3 categories),
 nonwhite, married and age (10 categories); and years of schooling, labor force experience (through quartic), and log hourly real
 wage (1982 prices, through cubic).  All displayed coefficients are equal to the indicated group times the real decrease (absolute
 value of the change in logarithms) in the minimum wage between year t and t+1.  The coefficients and elasticities show the 
 partial effects on the probability of employment in year t, given employment in year t+1.  A separate equation was estimated for
 each demographic panel.  Only people aged 16-60 years old were considered.  Sample size is 71,421.20
Table 4 (continued)
Estimated Effect of Real U.S. Minimum Wage Increases On Prior
Employment Probabilities (Excluding Tips) - Detailed Age Categories
Name of effect Coefficient
Standard 
Error P-Value Elasticity
A. Women, hourly wage
21 £ Aget £ 25 3.1440 1.3908 0.0240 0.8510
26 £ Aget £ 30 6.7309 1.4908 0.0000 1.4978
31 £ Aget £ 35 7.4479 1.5086 0.0000 1.5938
36 £ Aget £ 40 6.8232 1.5113 0.0000 1.5748
41 £ Aget £ 45 12.6804 1.5574 0.0000 2.7660
46 £ Aget £ 50 22.8056 1.6439 0.0000 4.4003
51 £ Aget £ 55 31.9469 1.7454 0.0000 5.8009
56 £ Aget  48.7302 1.9564 0.0000 7.4251
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(21 £ Aget £ 25) -9.0535 1.5755 0.0000 -3.5394
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(26 £ Aget £ 30) -14.2678 1.9440 0.0000 -5.7108
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(31 £ Aget £ 35) -9.5838 2.1103 0.0000 -3.4668
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(36 £ Aget £ 40) -8.2292 2.2667 0.0000 -3.2700
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(41 £ Aget £ 45) -6.5022 2.4582 0.0080 -2.2465
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(46 £ Aget £ 50) -6.4962 2.6236 0.0130 -1.9534
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(51 £ Aget £ 55) -11.2321 2.6889 0.0000 -3.5751
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(56 £ Aget ) -10.9929 3.1415 0.0000 -2.6475
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(21 £ Aget £ 25) -5.9195 1.4115 0.0000 -1.9741
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(26 £ Aget £ 30) -7.7029 1.6348 0.0000 -2.4201
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(31 £ Aget £ 35) -8.4522 1.6982 0.0000 -2.7275
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(36 £ Aget £ 40) -1.8897 1.7787 0.2880 -0.5692
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(41 £ Aget £ 45) -0.6418 1.9927 0.7470 -0.1764
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(46 £ Aget £ 50) -5.5597 2.1178 0.0090 -1.4622
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(51 £ Aget £ 55) -5.6214 2.3062 0.0150 -1.3480
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(56 £ Aget ) -13.5414 2.4756 0.0000 -3.3371
Source: American Current Population Survey, 1981-87, matched year to year.
Notes: Equations estimated by maximum likelihood logit. All equations include indicators for year, region (3 categories),
 nonwhite, married and age (10 categories); and years of schooling, labor force experience (through quartic), and log hourly real
 wage (1982 prices, through cubic).  All displayed coefficients are equal to the indicated group times the real decrease (absolute
 value of the change in logarithms) in the minimum wage between year t and t+1.  The coefficients and elasticities show the 
 partial effects on the probability of employment in year t, given employment in year t+1.  A separate equation was estimated for
 each demographic panel.  Only people aged 16-60 years old were considered.  Sample size is 73,094.
The results for women are more consistently coherent with the hypothesis that minimum
wages affect “between” workers more than “marginally above” workers than are the results for
American men.  The coefficients for the different age groups of the female workers paid around
the minimum wage (with the exception of women over 55) are always more negative than those
estimated for female workers in the same age group paid marginally above the minimum wage.
Furthermore, the average effect of the minimum wage on employment is larger for women than21
for men; a decrease of the real minimum wage of 1% between t and t+1 is related to an increased
probability of having been non-employed at t of 1.57% (relative to marginal workers).
As with the French data, these results are consistent with the perfectly competitive
markets view of the labor market, in that decreases in the real minimum wage make non-employed
workers easier to employ, and these workers enter disproportionately between the two minimum
wages.  Larger decreases in the real minimum raise the share of those employed at date t+1 at real
wages between the two minima who were not previously employed at date t by a larger amount
than for other groups.
It is interesting to note the differences, or rather lack of differences, between the results
that measure wages with and without tips (see appendix B).  None of the qualitative results seems
sensitive to the manner in which we define wages; however, some intuition can be gleaned from
how the coefficients shift when going from measures without tips to measures with tips.  For men,
the differences in the elasticities for between and marginal workers shrink.  In other words, when
men in the below category are reclassified as between, men in the between category are
reclassified as marginal, and men in the marginal category are reclassified as above, the differences
in elasticities among the “between” and “marginally-above” categories are reduced.  Since this
correction is intended to compensate for the differences in the relevant minimum wages for tip-
and non-tip receiving workers, it suggests that heterogeneity between employed workers across
the wage distribution is also playing a role in determining the differences in elasticities.  For
women, on the other hand, all of the relevant coefficients become more negative when tips are
included in the wage measure.  This further reinforces the idea that one needs to control for
heterogeneity, as it suggests that the lowest paid workers are even less likely to have been
previously employed than their higher-paid counterparts.
One possible explanation of our results for the young Americans is related to our approach
that considers previous employment in the United States.  Among young people, many of the
transitions from non-employment to employment could be first jobs following the end of
schooling
20.  Since we control for schooling in our estimates, comparing coefficients for
“between” workers and “marginally above” workers of the same age should control for early
career differences not related to the minimum wage, provided that entry into the labor force does
not occur disproportionately in a particular wage category conditional on the individual’s
educational attainment.
5.c.  Overall Elasticities
To improve comparability between our analysis, which is done conditional on the
employment state in either year t (France) or year t+1 (U.S.), and other analyses, which consider
the effects of the minimum wage unconditional on the previous or future employment state, we
compute the unconditional elasticities implied by our estimates.  To calculate an unconditional
elasticity we apply Bayes law to obtain the relation between the forms of the analysis equations
we used for France and the United States.  Hence, we have
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20 See Topel and Ward (1992), among others, for an analysis of early-career mobility in the United States.22
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Notice that the derivative in equation (4) simplifies because the denominator in the ratio of
unconditional probabilities in equation (3) does not depend upon the future minimum wage.
On the right hand side of equation (4) there are two terms.  For France, we can estimate
only the first of these two terms because the real minimum wage is always increasing.  The
conditions necessary for estimating the second term occur in the United States, where the real
minimum wage is always decreasing.  To estimate the unconditional elasticity in equation (4) we
must make an assumption regarding the term that cannot be estimated in the particular country.
We assume that this term is zero, which means that increases in the real minimum wage do not
change the rate at which nonemployed workers become employed and, conversely, decreases in
the real minimum wage do not change the rate at which employed workers at t remain employed
at t+1.
To take advantage of the structure of our estimates in Tables 2 and 4, we computed the
required conditional elasticities in equation (4) according to the following formula for France,
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where the summation is taken over the different age groups. We use the comparable formula for
the US.  Our results are summarized in Table 5.23
Table 5
Elasticity Estimates for Men and Women
Rate of Change of Employment Probability
for a 1% Increase in the Real Minimum Wage
France U.S.
Conditional (aggregated over age groups)
Men -1.293 -0.416
Women -0.972 -1.566
Unconditional (aggregated over age groups)
Men -0.015 -0.027
Women -0.022 -0.179
Sources: France, Tables 1, and 2 and the Labor Force Survey; U.S., Tables 1
and 4, and the Current Population Survey.
Notes: The conditional elasticity is the weighted average of the elasticities for
each age group in Tables 2 and 4 reported as the difference between the 
elasticity for the "at minimum" group as compared to the "marginally above"
group. The unconditional elasticity is an estimate of the rate of change of the
employment probability in period t+1 given a one percent increase in the real
minimum wage between periods t and t+1.
As an alternative exercise, we could use the estimates from France to capture the first
right-hand side term in equation 4 and the estimates from the United States to capture the second.
Of course, there are many underlying assumptions that would need to be satisfied for such an
approach to be valid.  Nevertheless, in this case, we find an unconditional elasticity of
employment with respect to the minimum wage of -0.042 for men and -0.201 for women.  In both
cases, it is the component of the elasticity that is derived from the United States results that
dominates (mostly because a larger share of the population is in the “between” category in the
United States than in France), but these results suggest that, even in the unconditional sense, a 10
percent increase in the minimum wage reduces male employment by 0.4 percent and female
employment by 2 percent.
6.  Conclusion
We have shown that, mostly for persons 35 years old and under, in both France and the
United States, movements in the real minimum wage are associated with significant employment
effects, typically in the direction predicted by competitive labor market theory.  In France, as the
real SMIC increased over the period from 1981 to 1989, a certain share of young French workers
had real wages that fell between the increasing consecutive real minimum wages.  For workers in
this situation, subsequent employment probabilities fell significantly.  However, participation in
employment promotion programs apparently shielded the youngest of these workers from some of
the effects of the increasing real SMIC, and when this eligibility ended, the probability of24
subsequent nonemployment shot up dramatically.  In the United States, a comparable effect from
the real minimum wage moving in the opposite direction occurred, as many workers had market
opportunity wage rates that were passed by the declining real minimum wage over the period
from 1981 to 1987.  American workers whose current real wage rate would have been below the
real minimum wage in earlier periods were much less likely to have been employed in those earlier
periods.
By comparing effects of minimum wage movements on workers employed at the minimum
with those employed marginally above it, we identify the direct effects of the minimum wage, as
distinct from heterogeneity across the wage distribution in labor force attachment and response to
macroeconomic shocks.  We suppose that workers in these two groups have identical labor
supply behavior.  We find that those employed between two real minima have much lower
subsequent employment probabilities in France and much lower prior employment probabilities in
the U.S.  Across the population as whole, however, our results also suggest that youth in both
countries and women in the U.S. are most affected by movements in the real minimum wage.
Even if the conditional elasticities in question are large, the at-risk groups (workers
between two minimum wages) are relatively small, specifically, 1% of adult men and 2% of adult
women in France, 6.5% of adult men and 11.6% of adult women in the U.S.  Thus, overall
unconditional elasticities tend to be much lower than the elasticities conditional on being between
the two minima.  If the relevant policy question concerns the impact of the minimum wage on
those individuals most likely to be affected by it (i.e. those currently paid at the minimum wage),
our results suggest that there are much larger negative employment effects on this group,
especially as compared to the group in the wage distribution marginally above the minimum, than
other research has found.
Our results, which are based on direct data evidence from households, contrast sharply
with the results of Card and Krueger (1994, 1998), which are based on direct data evidence from
establishments.  Recently, Kramarz and Philippon (1998) have analyzed the French data for 1990
to 1997, focusing carefully on the effects of targeted payroll tax subsidies on the total labor cost
of minimum wage and low-wage workers.  Their results, for a period of analysis that contains
intervals in which the total labor cost of minimum wage workers rises and falls, are essentially the
same as the ones we find here.  A priori, there is no reason to prefer household analyses over
those based on establishments; however, the strong similarity between the French and American
results in our paper present a stronger challenge to the Card and Krueger results than would be
the case for an analysis of either country taken by itself.25
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Appendix Table A
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(Francs)
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1951 173.3 0.89 1.95 154.41 145.15 195.78 6.00 26.79 45.60
1952 173.3 1.00 1.96 173.33 162.93 220.74 6.00 27.35 50.98
1953 173.3 1.00 1.98 173.33 182.33 222.47 6.00 28.35 50.39
1954 173.3 1.15 2.29 199.98 187.98 256.67 6.00 28.35 50.21
1955 173.3 1.25 2.46 216.45 203.46 277.81 6.00 28.35 50.80
1956 173.3 1.26 2.43 218.40 205.30 280.32 6.00 28.35 51.80
1957 173.3 1.29 2.42 223.78 210.35 287.22 6.00 28.35 53.21
1958 173.3 1.46 2.39 253.87 238.64 319.50 6.00 28.85 61.19
1959 173.3 1.58 2.43 270.62 253.84 349.51 6.20 29.15 64.98
1960 173.3 1.61 2.39 279.19 261.88 360.57 6.20 29.15 67.40
1961 173.3 1.64 2.36 284.69 267.04 370.52 6.20 30.15 69.59
1962 173.3 1.72 2.36 298.77 278.45 393.33 7.05 31.65 72.91
1963 173.3 1.84 2.41 319.62 297.09 418.88 7.05 31.05 76.38
1964 173.3 1.89 2.39 328.27 305.13 430.20 7.05 31.05 78.98
1965 173.3 1.97 2.43 342.28 318.15 448.56 7.05 31.05 80.98
1966 173.3 2.06 2.48 358.27 331.15 468.00 7.05 31.36 83.22
1967 173.3 2.13 2.49 368.32 339.66 498.45 8.15 35.33 85.41
1968 173.3 2.68 3.00 484.81 426.84 617.17 8.17 32.78 89.28
1969 173.3 3.16 3.32 548.16 503.32 728.07 8.18 32.82 95.12
1970 173.3 3.42 3.42 591.92 543.50 786.13 8.18 32.81 100.00
1971 173.3 3.76 3.56 651.72 598.15 867.31 8.22 33.08 105.52
1972 173.3 4.19 3.74 725.96 668.00 971.62 8.26 33.84 111.99
1973 173.3 4.95 4.12 858.27 786.52 1151.28 8.36 34.14 120.20
1974 173.3 6.10 4.46 1053.74 967.78 1421.63 8.42 34.53 136.71
1975 173.3 7.26 4.75 1260.25 1150.86 1711.87 8.68 35.82 152.80
1976 173.3 8.34 4.98 1466.01 1306.18 1981.47 9.67 37.03 167.49
1977 173.3 9.40 5.13 1629.59 1464.19 2239.06 10.15 37.40 183.22
1978 173.3 10.61 5.31 1839.61 1650.68 2536.45 10.27 37.88 199.82
1979 173.3 11.94 5.40 2068.69 1817.14 2843.62 12.14 38.91 221.30
1980 173.3 13.80 5.49 2391.67 2085.54 3324.42 12.80 39.00 251.30
1981 173.3 16.30 5.72 2824.41 2478.98 3925.93 12.23 39.00 285.00
1982 169.0 19.17 6.02 3323.46 2892.07 4623.60 12.98 39.12 318.70
1983 169.0 21.50 6.16 3725.87 3216.92 5221.43 13.66 40.14 349.29
1984 169.0 23.53 6.27 4077.88 3465.79 5693.33 15.01 39.62 375.19
1985 169.0 25.44 6.41 4335.00 3676.51 6056.88 15.19 39.72 397.04
1986 169.0 26.53 6.51 4482.87 3777.27 6270.64 15.74 39.88 407.62
1987 169.0 27.60 6.56 4663.84 3894.77 6528.91 16.49 39.99 420.43
1988 169.0 28.65 6.64 4791.71 3977.60 6715.10 16.99 40.14 431.74
1989 169.0 29.54 6.60 4991.42 4093.46 6943.58 17.99 39.11 447.33
1990 169.0 30.80 6.66 5205.20 4269.83 7182.13 17.97 37.89 462.38
1991 169.0 32.30 6.77 5458.70 4547.95 7527.66 17.39 37.90 477.20
1992 169.0 33.58 6.87 5674.46 4606.38 7860.94 17.98 38.53 488.60
1993 169.0 34.45 6.91 5821.21 4794.70 7945.37 18.38 36.49 498.86
1994 169.0 35.20 6.92 5947.96 4881.38 7981.57 18.64 34.19 508.84
Source: Series longues sur les salaires (INSEE, 1998). 
Note: Data for 1950-1969 are for the earlier minimum wage system (SMIG).28
Appendix Table B
Estimated Effect of Real U.S. Minimum Wage Increases On Prior
Employment Probabilities (Including Tips) - Detailed Age Categories
Name of effect Coefficient
Standard 
Error P-Value Elasticity
A. Men, hourly wage
21 £ Aget £ 25 -3.7133 1.3866 0.0070 -0.6013
26 £ Aget £ 30 -5.2490 1.6110 0.0010 -0.5811
31 £ Aget £ 35 -9.1430 1.6925 0.0000 -0.8786
36 £ Aget £ 40 -14.0308 1.7511 0.0000 -1.5081
41 £ Aget £ 45 -18.8339 1.7492 0.0000 -2.5996
46 £ Aget £ 50 -16.3178 1.7679 0.0000 -2.3618
51 £ Aget £ 55 -5.0601 1.8390 0.0060 -0.6415
56 £ Aget  6.7701 1.9670 0.0010 0.8107
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(21 £ Aget £ 25) -4.6953 2.2642 0.0380 -1.1402
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(26 £ Aget £ 30) -15.9607 3.7541 0.0000 -4.7073
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(31 £ Aget £ 35) -13.3353 4.9322 0.0070 -3.0539
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(36 £ Aget £ 40) 4.4454 7.7487 0.5660 0.8298
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(41 £ Aget £ 45) -2.9877 5.8566 0.6100 -0.7469
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(46 £ Aget £ 50) -4.6705 5.9445 0.4320 -1.2415
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(51 £ Aget £ 55) -5.9574 6.0917 0.3280 -1.6101
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(56 £ Aget ) -6.5607 5.7874 0.2570 -1.7636
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(21 £ Aget £ 25) -6.8262 1.7662 0.0000 -1.6020
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(26 £ Aget £ 30) -12.6935 2.6654 0.0000 -2.8544
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(31 £ Aget £ 35) -11.5435 3.4576 0.0010 -2.5990
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(36 £ Aget £ 40) -10.8373 4.3708 0.0130 -2.6272
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(41 £ Aget £ 45) -3.7462 4.2574 0.3790 -0.9365
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(46 £ Aget £ 50) -0.3138 5.1503 0.9510 -0.0740
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(51 £ Aget £ 55) -5.1100 4.5995 0.2670 -1.2264
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(56 £ Aget ) -1.8436 4.5136 0.6830 -0.3408
Source:  American Current Population Survey, 1981-87, matched year to year.
Notes: Equations estimated by maximum likelihood logit. All equations include indicators for year, region (3 categories),
 nonwhite, married and age (10 categories); and years of schooling, labor force experience (through quartic), and log hourly real
 wage (1982 prices, through cubic).  All displayed coefficients are equal to the indicated group times the real decrease (absolute
 value of the change in logarithms) in the minimum wage between year t and t+1.  The coefficients and elasticities show the 
 partial effects on the probability of employment in year t, given employment in year t+1.  A separate equation was estimated for
 each demographic panel.  Only people aged 16-60 years old were considered.  Sample size is 71,421.29
Appendix Table B (continued)
Estimated Effect of Real U.S. Minimum Wage Increases On Prior
Employment Probabilities (Including Tips) - Detailed Age Categories
Name of effect Coefficient
Standard 
Error P-Value Elasticity
A. Women, hourly wage
21 £ Aget £ 25 3.8903 1.2833 0.0020 1.0529
26 £ Aget £ 30 7.2803 1.3950 0.0000 1.6129
31 £ Aget £ 35 8.0729 1.4171 0.0000 1.7212
36 £ Aget £ 40 7.7631 1.4201 0.0000 1.7884
41 £ Aget £ 45 13.4222 1.4676 0.0000 2.9242
46 £ Aget £ 50 23.0382 1.5487 0.0000 4.4209
51 £ Aget £ 55 32.6692 1.6617 0.0000 5.9337
56 £ Aget  48.6765 1.8666 0.0000 7.3983
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(21 £ Aget £ 25) -11.3338 1.6256 0.0000 -4.6831
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(26 £ Aget £ 30) -17.1474 2.0566 0.0000 -7.3606
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(31 £ Aget £ 35) -11.0905 2.2165 0.0000 -4.1439
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(36 £ Aget £ 40) -10.2470 2.4104 0.0000 -4.1930
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(41 £ Aget £ 45) -8.3150 2.5738 0.0010 -2.9113
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(46 £ Aget £ 50) -8.8520 2.7342 0.0010 -2.8346
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(51 £ Aget £ 55) -11.3742 2.8218 0.0000 -3.5739
(Real Mint+1 £ Real Waget £ Real Mint)*(56 £ Aget ) -12.0686 3.2941 0.0000 -3.0079
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(21 £ Aget £ 25) -6.6043 1.3639 0.0000 -2.2229
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(26 £ Aget £ 30) -8.5586 1.6136 0.0000 -2.7317
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(31 £ Aget £ 35) -9.3514 1.6828 0.0000 -3.0981
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(36 £ Aget £ 40) -3.4856 1.7688 0.0490 -1.0843
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(41 £ Aget £ 45) -1.7565 1.9919 0.3780 -0.4964
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(46 £ Aget £ 50) -4.8975 2.1261 0.0210 -1.2695
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(51 £ Aget £ 55) -7.8053 2.2738 0.0010 -1.9686
(Real Mint £ Real Waget £ Real ($4.00)t)*(56 £ Aget ) -12.6289 2.4772 0.0000 -3.0437
Source: American Current Population Survey, 1981-87, matched year to year.
Notes: Equations estimated by maximum likelihood logit. All equations include indicators for year, region (3 categories),
 nonwhite, married and age (10 categories); and years of schooling, labor force experience (through quartic), and log hourly real
 wage (1982 prices, through cubic).  All displayed coefficients are equal to the indicated group times the real decrease (absolute
 value of the change in logarithms) in the minimum wage between year t and t+1.  The coefficients and elasticities show the 
 partial effects on the probability of employment in year t, given employment in year t+1.  A separate equation was estimated for
 each demographic panel.  Only people aged 16-60 years old were considered.  Sample size is 73,094.30
Appendix Table C
Differences in Elasticities of Future/Previous
Employment Probabilities
France United States
Age Men Women Men Women
16 £ Age £ 20 -2.1045 -0.1542 -1.1140 -0.7772
(6.0977) (1.5825) (1.5820) (0.8550)
21 £ Age £ 25 -1.4170 -2.0437 -0.1355 -1.5653
(1.7421) (1.0841) (1.7713) (0.7449)
26 £ Age £ 30 -3.2181 -2.5721 -1.6216 -3.2907
(1.8743) (1.3441) (4.2231) (1.1902)
31 £ Age £ 35 -4.3027 -1.0455 -2.2914 -0.7392
(5.4992) (1.3455) (7.5161) (1.2324)
36 £ Age £ 40 0.8552 0.2185 3.7072 -2.7008
(2.4334) (1.0361) (10.8824) (1.5988)
41 £ Age £ 45 -2.2583 -3.7943 -1.7165 -2.0700
(4.8550) (2.7081) (11.0871) (2.0545)
46 £ Age £ 50 1.4235 -0.3589 0.7099 -0.4912
(2.2792) (1.8311) (11.6294) (2.3493)
51 £ Age £ 55 0.0739 -0.8479 0.4193 -2.2270
(6.2361) (2.1963) (11.0640) (2.9941)
56 £ Age 2.4305 2.1663 0.0355 0.6895
(26.9559) (7.0067) (11.9918) (3.3252)
Source:  Tables 1, 2 and 4.
Notes: Table presents the difference between the elasticity for the
 "between" group as compared to the "marginally over" group.
 Standard Errors are in parentheses.